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The impact of aid inflows on relative prices and output is ambiguous. Aid inflows that 
increase domestic expenditure are likely to cause real exchange rate appreciation, 
ceteris paribus. However, if this expenditure raises the capital stock in the traded goods 
sector, then output in this sector might not contract, at least in the steady state. 
Moreover, if investment in the nontraded goods sector is relatively high and/or 
productive, then there is not necessarily any real exchange rate appreciation in the 
steady state. We use time-series data to examine the impact of aid inflows on output and 
real exchange rates in ten South Pacific island states, and find aid inflows to produce a 
variety of outcomes in economies of different kinds. 
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There is already a large literature examining the macroeconomic consequences of aid 
inflows in developing countries. Part of this literature deals with the impact of aid on 
relative prices and output. An increase in foreign exchange income, from any source, is 
likely to impact on domestic relative prices (Corden 1984). Under fixed nominal 
exchange rates in a small open economy, the effect is straightforward. The price of 
internationally traded goods is fixed on world markets, and increased domestic 
expenditure will raise only the price of goods that are not internationally traded. This 
relative price change will lead to a change in the composition of output, with the traded 
goods sector contracting, and a change in the sectoral allocation of resources. These 
changes do not necessarily lead to a reduction in social welfare, but welfare concerns 
arise when there are changes in the income distribution—especially when the poor own 
factors of production specific to the traded goods sector—and when there are externalities 
that motivate traded sector subsidies ex ante. In this case, the relative price changes work 
in the opposite direction to the appropriate subsidy, reducing aggregate productivity, so 
aggregate output falls, justifying the description of the relative price effect as ‘Dutch 
disease’.1 Examples of this idea include van Wijnbergen (1984); Salehi-Esfahani (1988); 
Sachs and Warner (1995); Gylafson, Herbertson and Zoega (1997); Elbadawi (1999) and 
Adam and O’Connell (2004).  
In fact, in the basic Dutch disease model, the nature of the exchange rate regime makes 
little difference to the effects of an increase in foreign exchange income. Suppose for 
example that two goods (traded and nontraded) are produced by a single factor of 
production (labour). There will be two domestic market equilibrium conditions (for 
nontraded goods and for labour), and a balance-of-payments equilibrium condition, with 
only two endogenous relative prices: that of nontraded goods relative to traded goods and 
that of labour relative to traded goods. General equilibrium can only be attained through 
adjustment of real money balances, and in a basic model it does not matter whether this is 
achieved by nominal exchange rate adjustment or by an adjustment of foreign exchange 
reserves under a fixed nominal exchange rate. 
The most interesting extensions to this basic framework explore the dynamics of a model 
in which some of the increased expenditure is on capital goods, as in Adam and Bevan 
(2006). Now, increased productivity in the nontraded goods sector can offset the standard 
relative price effect, at least in the steady state, and investment in the traded goods sector 
can offset any remaining contractionary effect there. It remains an empirical question how 
long it takes to reach the steady state, how much real exchange rate appreciation there is 
before the steady state is attained, and how much of a productivity loss there is during the 
transition period. Moreover, with sticky domestic prices, the nature of the exchange rate 
regime is likely to matter to the transition process. A flexible exchange rate—either a 
floating rate or an adjustable peg—is likely to facilitate faster relative price adjustment 
and a shorter transition period. If there are productivity losses during transition, then a 
fixed exchange rate is likely to entail some overall welfare loss.  
In this paper we use timeseries data to explore the evidence for Dutch disease effects from 
increased aid inflows in ten small open economies in the South Pacific. These countries 
                                                 
1  The term was originally applied to the consequences of a natural resource discovery in the 
Netherlands. 2 
display a substantial degree of economic heterogeneity, and we see a corresponding level 
of heterogeneity in their response to aid inflows. Before describing our econometric 
model, we briefly review existing evidence from other parts of the world. 
2  Existing evidence on aid and Dutch disease 
Work on Dutch disease in developing countries is hampered by a lack of data. All 
researchers face a choice between an econometric model that eschews much of the 
detail of the existing theory, and a more detailed model with parameters that are 
‘calibrated’ rather than estimated. Timeseries and panel econometric studies mostly find 
a link between the real exchange rate and the volume of aid inflows. However, the 
elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to aid varies substantially from one 
study to another. Adenauer and Vagassky (1998) find substantial real exchange rate 
appreciation effects in the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union. Similar results appear in the work of White and Wignaraja (1992) on Sri Lanka, 
and of Prati and Tressel (2006), who use a large cross-country panel. Here, estimates of 
the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to aid inflows range up to 30 per 
cent. Bourdet and Falck (2006) find that aid inflows in the Cape Verde Islands also 
cause some real exchange rate appreciation, although the effect is relatively small, with 
an elasticity of less than 10 per cent. In contrast, Nyomi (1998) and Sackey (2001) find 
that aid inflows lead to real exchange rate depreciation in Tanzania and Ghana, 
respectively. There is some depreciation even in the short run (i.e., within one year of an 
increase in aid). This suggests that in some countries the offsetting productivity effects 
kick in very quickly indeed, or that the standard Dutch disease model is in some way 
inappropriate. In this regard, Atingi-Ego (2005) suggests that there is excess capacity in 
the nontraded goods sector of some African countries, so increases in demand are not 
likely to cause any substantial price increase. 
Results from CGE models of the effect of aid inflows are similarly mixed. The work of 
Bandara (1995), Jemio and Jansen (1993), Jemio and Vos (1993) and Vos (1998) 
suggests that in some countries there is likely to be enough investment by firms in the 
traded goods sector to ensure that this sector expands as a result of an increase in aid 
inflows. Examples of this case include Mexico, Sri Lanka and Thailand. However, in 
other countries, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, there are more conventional Dutch 
disease effects, with an appreciating real exchange rate and a contracting traded goods 
sector. The dynamic CGE model presented in Adam and Bevan (2004), which is 
calibrated to data from Uganda, indicates that the response of the real exchange rate and 
traded good production to an aid inflow is very sensitive to variations in the 
composition of aid expenditure. Nevertheless, substantial real exchange rate 
appreciation is much less likely in the steady state than it is in the short run. This result 
also appears in Laplange, Treadgold and Baldry (2001), one of very few papers to 
attempt to model the economies of the South Pacific. Calibrating a CGE model to data 
from the Cook Islands, where labour is internationally mobile, and Kiribati, where 
labour is mostly not internationally mobile, they find substantial real exchange rate 
appreciation in the short run, with aid elasticities of 25 per cent and 10 per cent, 
respectively. However, steady state elasticities are very close to zero. 
The existing evidence on the macroeconomic effects of aid inflows gives the 
overwhelming impression that there are few, if any, generalisations to be made across 
different developing countries. We should not expect to see uniformity in the 3 
macroeconomic response of different South Pacific economies to an increase in aid. As 
we will see, these countries do exhibit a great deal of macroeconomic heterogeneity; 
nevertheless, certain patterns do emerge. 
3  Modelling the macroeconomic impact of aid in the South Pacific 
The developing economies of the South Pacific have received almost no attention in the 
macroeconomic literature. However, they account for a substantial fraction of the 
foreign aid budgets of Australia and New Zealand. The different Pacific islands 
encompass a wide variety of economies, and we explore the effect of official 
development assistance (ODA) in these islands as a representative case study of the 
impact of aid in small open developing economies.  
Table 1 indicates some basic economic characteristics of the economies we will be 
looking at. Both Table 1 and our econometric analysis exclude those Pacific territories 
with a population of under ten thousand, and also those, such as Papua New Guinea, 
with a population of over one million. The largest is Fiji, with a population of close to 
one million, and a current level of PPP-adjusted GDP of over US$5 billion. The 
smallest is Tuvalu, with a population of 12,000 and a GDP of just over US$15 million. 
The different economies listed in Table 1 represent a wide range of per capita income 
levels. The French territories (French Polynesia and New Caledonia) are in the high 
middle-income range, with annual per capita income levels well in excess of 
US$10,000. At the other extreme, Tonga, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands have annual 
per capita income levels of only around US$2,000. There is even more variance in the 
levels of aid dependency. Over the past three decades, ODA to Fiji has amounted to 
only around 3 per cent of GDP, while aid to Tuvalu has amounted to over 80 per cent.   
Table 1 
Pacific states and territories with populations of 10,000-1,000,000 





PPP adjusted GDP 
(billions of US$)(2 
ODA 1970-2003 
(% GDP)(2 
        
Cook Islands   No    21  0.11  26.7 
Fiji   Yes  906  5.38    2.9 
French Polynesia   No  276  4.58  11.3 
Kiribati   No  105  0.79  39.7 
New Caledonia   No  219  3.16  12.7 
Samoa   Yes  177  1.00  15.6 
Solomon Islands   Yes  552  0.80  20.8 
Tonga   Yes  115  0.24  19.3 
Tuvalu   No    12  0.02  81.9 
Vanuatu   Yes  209  0.58  21.8 
Without adequate data         
F. S. Micronesia   No  108  0.28   
Marshall Islands   No    60  0.12   
Nauru   No    13  0.06   
Source:  (1  CIA World Factbook; 
(2 OECD/DAC. 4 
Table 2 
Main identifiable components of sectoral value added and exports  













Communication  Exports 
          
Cook Islands   11.4  5.5  31.6  12.5    6.8 
Fiji   17.3  15.7  14.9  11.1  56.2 
French Polynesia     4.0    9.0  23.4    6.6    9.1 
Kiribati   24.6    2.8  15.4  13.9  58.1 
New Caledonia     2.0  19.1  23.0    5.5  22.2 
Samoa   17.3  21.2  16.8  10.9  26.2 
Solomon Islands   43.5    6.6    8.6    4.1  57.9 
Tonga   28.3    6.5  12.6    6.9  21.6 
Tuvalu  19.2    7.4  16.2    6.0  15.9 
Vanuatu   22.6    6.5  32.9    7.7  52.8 
Source:  UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. 
Table 2 shows the variation in economic structure for those ten territories for which 
adequate data are available from the UN National Accounts statistics database. The 
table includes figures for the share of GDP accounted for by value added in three broad 
aggregates of (potentially) traded goods: agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining and 
manufacturing; hotels, restaurants and retail trade. It can be seen that the relative sizes 
of these components, and of the residual (mostly publicly provided services) vary 
considerably from one island to another. The table also shows that the same is true of 
export performance. Four economies have a reasonably high level of export 
performance: in Fiji, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, the ratio of exports to 
GDP generally exceeds 50 per cent. However, there are also two—the Cook Islands and 
French Polynesia—in which the ratio is typically below 10 per cent.  
Given this degree of macroeconomic heterogeneity, we should allow for substantial 
variation in the response of different territories to aid inflows. This suggests that cross-
country panel data analysis is inappropriate in our case. However, macroeconomic data 
on these territories are very limited, with few economies in which many variables are 
recorded for a substantial length of time. For this reason, we will fit a very simple time-
series model to the available data for our ten territories. The model we will use for 











































where yt is real GDP in year t, et is the real exchange rate and πt is the rate of growth of 
the GDP deflator. 
i
t u  is a reduced form regression residual for the i
th dependent variable. 
B(L) is a 3°3 matrix of lag polynominals indicating the interaction of the three 
dependent variables, and c(L) is a 1°3 matrix of lag polynomials indicating the impact 
on the system of our aid variable, aidt. This is defined as the ratio of ODA in year t to 
nominal GDP in year t-1. (The use of lagged GDP makes more plausible the assumption 
that our aid variable is weakly exogenous.) In the absence of convincing data on the 5 
relative price of traded and nontraded goods in each territory,2 the real exchange rate is 
defined as the ratio of the territory’s GDP deflator to the Australian GDP deflator, 
making a currency conversion at the prevailing official nominal exchange rate. We note 
in passing that the use of a PPP proxy for the real exchange rate introduces some 
measurement error in one of our dependent variables, and hence entails some efficiency 
loss in our estimator, relative to the (infeasible) option of using measured prices of 
traded and nontraded goods. See Palermo (2002) for a fuller discussion of alternative 
real exchange rate definitions. 
Equation (1) allows for the possibility that the real exchange rate and domestic inflation 
can evolve separately. This reflects the fact that some of the ten territories use a national 
currency, as indicated in Table 1. In these cases, the nominal exchange rate regime is 
usually an adjustable (sometimes undeclared) peg to a basket of foreign currencies, or 
else a dirty float. There is no commitment to a hard peg, and the nominal exchange rate 
can adjust in response to external shocks. For a given real exchange rate, some domestic 
inflation is possible, through proportional growth in both the domestic price index and 
the domestic currency price of the Australian dollar. However, there are also some 
territories without any national currency; these territories use instead the Australian or 
New Zealand dollar, or the CFP Franc. In these cases, domestic inflation cannot evolve 





























L B    (2) 
omitting the inflation equation. 
The data we use are for 1970-2003. Annual real and nominal GDP figures (and hence 
the GDP deflator) are taken from the UN National Accounts statistics database, as are 
the relevant nominal exchange rates. ODA figures are taken from the OECD-DAC.3 
One should note as a caveat that private capital flows are omitted from our model. Data 
on such flows are incomplete for many of the territories in our sample. However, what 
data do exist suggest that in most cases private flows have been very small relative to 
official flows, at least in the twentieth century. 
The lag orders in B(L) and c(L) are determined empirically, using the Akaike criterion 
as a guide. In all cases except that of Tuvalu two lags in B(L) and one in c(L) suffice; in 
Tuvalu two lags in c(L) are necessary.  
We cannot assume that the variables appearing in equations (1-2) are stationary. 
Generally, it is not possible to reject the null that they are I(1) in a sample as small as 
ours. However, it would be silly to try to apply the Johansen cointegration test in such a 
small sample, and other cointrgration tests assume the existence of a single 
cointegrating vector, an assumption that we have no good reason to make. Moreover, 
                                                 
2  Some territories report deflators for some components of GDP in some years. Even if the data were 
available for many countries for a substantial length of time, using these data would require some 
heroic assumptions about which sectors’ output was internationally tradable. 
3  The figures also correspond to official development assistance data appearing in the World Bank 
World Development Indicators. 6 
our main interest is in determining the size and sign of the impact of aid on the variables 
in our system, and we have no particular need to identify the parameters of a structural 
model from the reduced form parameters in B(L) and c(L). Our only real problem is in 
finding appropriate critical values for the t ratios on the reduced form parameters, 
particularly those in c(L). If some of the variables are I(1), then the t ratios will not have 
the standard student’s t distribution. We address this problem by bootstrapping our own 
t distributions from 100,000 replications of the fitted model.4 In the null data generating 
process, the dependent variables are independent of aid, but otherwise with the 
properties of the fitted model. The model of aid under the null is Δaidt = α + εt with the 
values of α and of the residual variance V(ε) estimated from the data.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the dependent variables in our ten territories. 
Average real growth rates over the last three decades vary from 1 per cent in Kiribati to 
over 4 per cent in Tonga and French Polynesia. However, in all cases the variance is 
very high relative to the mean. This is also true of growth in the real exchange rate and 
of the rate of domestic inflation. There is some trend in the real exchange rate in most 
territories, but one that is small relative to the year-on-year variation. The effects of aid 
discussed below should be seen in the context of a region in which the typical economy 
is often being subjected to large real and nominal shocks. 
Tables 4-5 present the results of fitting the VAR model to the data for our ten territories. 
Table 5 reports all of the fitted coefficients, along with t ratios some descriptive and 
diagnostic statistics for the regression equations. The ‘Test 1’ figures at the bottom of 
Table 5 are p-values for an LM autocorrelation test on the residual vector; the ‘Test 2’ 
figures are p-values for a normality test on the residual vector. Note that in many cases 
there is a single outlier in the distribution of regression residuals, and so many of the 
VARs contain a single dummy for that outlier, in order to ensure that the residual 
distribution is approximately normal. Inclusion of the dummies does not make a 
substantial difference to the sizes and significance levels of the estimated coefficients. It 
turns out that aid has a statistically significant impact on output and/or inflation in four 
out of the ten cases: in the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Tonga and Vanuatu. This should not 
be taken to imply that aid has no effect in the other six, but rather that with the limited 
 
Table 3 
Annual percentage growth rates, 1970-2003  
  GDP    Real exchange rate    GDP deflator 
 Mean  Std dev.   Mean  Std dev.   Mean  Std dev. 
              
Cook Islands  1.06  5.39     2.16  9.20     8.56  6.45 
Fiji 3.17  4.69   -0.46  9.14     6.31  6.00 
French Polynesia  4.33  4.57     0.43  11.94     4.98  6.05 
Kiribati 0.95  15.58   -0.70  6.31     5.37  5.90 
New Caledonia  2.42  7.29     0.01  12.85     4.56  7.10 
Samoa 1.62  3.62   -0.95  7.87     7.76  8.87 
Solomon Islands  3.29  7.70   -1.53  11.40     9.33  7.47 
Tonga 4.28  7.07   -1.07  11.05     5.99  11.45 
Tuvalu 3.05  8.81     1.24  8.70     7.31  8.98 
Vanuatu 3.88  7.70   -2.24  13.18     2.75  7.37 
                                                 
4  The model is fitted using Pc-Give 10.0, and the replications are performed using Pc-Naive 2.0. 
Source:  UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. 7 
data available we are able to reject the null that it is inconsequential in only the four 
cases. Table 4 reports just the aid coefficients and corresponding t ratios in the four 
territories, but also includes the simulated 5 per cent critical values. Note that the 
coefficients in Table 4 are derived by fitting equation (1) to data from Tonga and 
Vanuatu, and fitting equation (2) to data from the Cook Islands and Tuvalu. 
As Tables 1-3 show, the four territories appearing in Table 4 embody a substantial 
degree of macroeconomic heterogeneity. However, the one factor that they share is that 
they are the four smallest economies in our sample, measured by total GDP (Table 1, 
column 2). The strongest evidence for an aid effect is evident in the smallest territories. 
The size of average aid inflows relative to GDP is unusually high in one of them 
(Tuvalu), but not in the other three, at least in comparison with the six economies 
registering no significant aid effect (Table 1, column 3). 
Table 4 
Aid coefficients for the Cook Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
    Coefficient  t ratio  5% c. v. (a 
 COOK  ISLANDS 
      
Current aid  -0.030  -0.79    GDP equation (y) 
Lagged aid  -0.120  -3.26  -2.13 
       
Current aid   0.168   5.17   2.06  RER equation (e) 
Lagged aid   0.207   4.18   2.07 
  TONGA 
      
Current aid   0.048   0.53    GDP equation (y) 
lagged aid   0.103   1.54   
       
Current aid  -0.304  -2.19   2.09  RER equation (e) 
Lagged aid   0.283   3.27   2.09 
       
Current aid  -0.319  -1.53    inflation equation (π) 
Lagged aid   0.223   2.10   
  TUVALU 
      
Current aid  -0.009  -0.90   
Lagged aid  -0.010  -1.11   
GDP equation (y) 
Lagged aid (2)  -0.026  -2.37  -2.00 
       
Current aid   0.033   2.02   2.00 
Lagged aid   0.026   2.17   2.00 
RER equation (e) 
Lagged aid (2)   0.029   2.29   1.99 
  VANUATU 
      
Current aid  -0.090  -1.14    GDP equation (y) 
Lagged aid  -0.365  -1.68   
       
Current aid  -0.129  -0.96    RER equation (e) 
lagged aid   0.014   0.07   
       
Current aid   0.306   3.37   2.08  inflation equation (π) 
Lagged aid   0.316   3.76   2.09 
Note:  (a  Critical values are simulated from 100,000 replications using Pc-Naive 2.0. In the null DGP, 
the dependent variables are independent of aid, but otherwise with the properties of the fitted 
model. The model of aid under the null is ∆aidt = α + εt with values of α and V(ε) estimated from 
the data. 1
Table 5 Fitted VAR coefficients 
ln(y) eq. coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio 
ln(y)-1 1.36 16.00 0.18 0.82 0.62 4.14 0.90 10.30 0.87 11.20 0.99 17.70 0.94 4.90 1.12 6.91 0.97 4.22 0.56 4.24
ln(y)-2 -0.59 -5.93 0.12 0.56 0.33 2.34 -0.12 -1.12 -0.07 -1.20 -0.03 -0.19 -0.09 -0.62 -0.24 -1.11 0.23 1.99
ln(e)-1 0.12 1.92 -0.04 -0.36 0.02 0.32 0.59 1.59 0.25 3.29 0.03 0.56 -0.29 -1.68 -0.34 -1.88 0.16 0.94 -0.35 -3.82
ln(e)-2 -0.03 -0.42 -0.05 -0.61 0.02 0.28 -0.71 -2.10 0.19 2.74 0.14 0.71 0.47 2.30 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.06
π-1 0.02 0.14 -0.06 -1.54 -0.01 -0.04 0.40 1.73 0.12 0.65
π- 2 -0.13 -0.79 0.14 0.87 -0.09 -1.01 0.20 1.23
aid -0.03 -0.79 0.85 1.34 -0.34 -0.64 -0.10 -0.80 -0.78 -1.84 -0.17 -1.19 -0.40 -1.68 0.05 0.53 -0.01 -0.90 -0.09 -1.14
aid -1 -0.12 -3.26 -1.50 -1.19 0.77 1.47 -0.10 -0.60 1.08 2.58 0.00 0.02 0.31 1.47 0.10 1.54 -0.01 -1.11 -0.36 -1.68
aid -2 -0.03 -2.37
intercept4 . 3 93.27 13.72 3.35 1.24 2.06 4.04 1.97 5.14 5.18 0.16 0.14 1.94 2.16 -0.66 -1.11 4.52 2.78 5.25 2.66
σ
ln(e) eq. coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio 
ln(y)-1 0.96 5.89 0.47 1.24 1.06 5.21 0.02 0.30 0.49 1.66 0.02 0.24 -0.08 -0.30 -0.90 -2.81 0.08 0.43 1.03 3.22
ln(y)-2 -0.48 -2.43 0.28 0.61 -0.93 -4.21 0.05 1.30 -0.24 -0.80 -0.02 -0.08 0.71 2.42 0.24 2.05 -1.01 -3.50
ln(e)-1 0.81 10.90 0.73 4.20 0.70 4.00 0.58 4.68 0.62 2.43 0.65 6.00 0.90 3.01 1.26 3.59 0.45 2.41 1.06 8.62
ln(e)-2 0.01 0.17 -0.28 -1.80 -0.47 -2.67 -0.04 -0.32 -0.37 -1.58 -0.66 -1.57 -0.77 -2.34 0.37 2.28 -0.14 -1.23
π-1 -0.13 -0.36 -0.20 -1.83 -0.94 -2.20 -0.81 -2.90 -0.01 -0.04
π- 2 -0.10 -0.65 -0.44 -3.47 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.72
aid 0.17 5.17 0.22 0.14 -0.95 -0.84 0.04 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.20 1.08 -0.27 -1.01 -0.30 -2.19 0.03 2.02 -0.13 -0.96
aid -1 0.21 4.18 -4.38 -1.70 -0.69 -0.97 -0.08 -0.84 -0.54 -0.54 -0.56 -1.86 -0.43 -1.97 0.28 3.27 0.03 2.17 0.01 0.07
aid -2 0.03 2.29
intercept -8.98 -5.56 -13.05 -1.54 -3.05 -1.54 -1.17 -1.46 -6.42 -3.22 -0.33 -0.19 2.41 2.03 3.72 4.63 -5.31 -2.87 -0.46 -0.32
σ
p eq. coeff. t ratio coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio  coeff. t ratio 
ln(y)-1 0.38 1.32 -0.15 -1.28 -0.10 -0.51 -0.84 -2.53 0.25 1.93
ln(y)-2 -0.27 -0.79 0.05 0.32 0.62 2.12 -0.16 -1.52
ln(e)-1 -0.20 -1.50 -0.24 -1.56 -0.27 -1.19 -0.26 -0.60 0.18 2.12
ln(e)-2 0.11 1.30 -0.10 -0.54 -0.25 -0.56 -0.05 -0.57
π-1 0.57 1.94 0.07 0.52 -0.65 -2.50 -0.23 -0.56 -0.44 -2.57
π- 2 -0.33 -1.81 -0.26 -2.24 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.44
aid -1.33 -1.44 -0.14 -0.41 -0.12 -0.62 -0.32 -1.53 0.31 3.37
aid -1 -0.14 -0.10 -0.28 -0.75 -0.14 -0.63 0.23 2.10 0.32 3.76





   Cook Islands    Fiji  Fr. Polynesia Kiribati   N. Caledonia Samoa  Solomon Is. Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.04
0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06
0.05 0.10 0.07 0.03
0.07
0.57












0.22 0.15 0.17 0.55
additional





In three of the four territories (the Cook Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), aid appears to be 
inflationary. Of these three territories, the two without a flexible nominal exchange rate 
regime (the Cook Islands and Tuvalu) register a significant real exchange rate 
appreciation, while the other (Vanuatu) registers significant domestic inflation without 
any significant change in the real exchange rate. One interpretation of these results is 
that in Vanuatu large aid inflows have been matched by a nominal exchange rate 
depreciation, which has prevented any real exchange rate appreciation. In the Cook 
Islands and Tuvalu, similar pressures cannot be released through nominal exchange rate 
adjustment: the Cook Islands use the New Zealand dollar and Tuvalu the Australian 
dollar. If the nominal exchange rate regime makes a difference here, then we are outside 
the bounds of a basic Dutch disease model, as explained in the introduction. The 
importance of the nominal exchange rate regime suggests that there is some nominal 
rigidity at work. Nominal wage inertia is one possible explanation, although we do not 
have the data to test this hypothesis directly. 
In Tonga, there is a significant but temporary real exchange rate depreciation in 
response to an aid inflow. As noted in the introduction, this is not the first country 
where such a result has been recorded; nevertheless, the reasons for the difference 
between Tonga and other small Pacific states warrant further investigation. Tonga is not 
an outlier along any of the dimensions featured in Tables 1-3. 
The magnitude of the inflationary effects recorded in Table 4 is depicted in Figures 1-4. 
The figures show the response of real GDP and the real exchange rate (or, in Vanuatu, 
the rate of domestic inflation), with an increase in aid inflows equivalent to one year’s 
GDP at t = 0. That is, the variable aidt increases by one unit. This is a much larger 
change in aid inflows than is typical in any of our countries; it represents an extreme 
scenario in which there is a very large innovation in donor policy. But remember that in 
our linear model the patterns in the figure would be the same if the innovation were 
smaller; only the scaling would change. The hypothetical increase in aid is temporary, 
lasting for a single year, and for the purposes of the figures we assume that aid is 
strongly exogenous to the variables of interest.5  
The figures for the Cook Islands and Tuvalu (Figures 1-2) look very similar, except for 
the scaling. The effects of a unit increase in aidt in Tuvalu are very much smaller. 
However, average aid inflows in Tuvalu are very much larger as a fraction of GDP 
(Table 1, column 3), and a typical increase or decrease in aid there is much larger than 
in the Cook Islands. In both places, there is a substantial real exchange rate appreciation 
within the first two years following the innovation; the growth in the real exchange rate 
is around 30 per cent in the Cook Islands and 6 per cent in Tuvalu. Thereafter, the real 
exchange rate depreciates again, and by year 4 is close to its original level. The 
appreciation causes a dip in GDP (by around 15 per cent in the Cook Islands and 3 per 
cent in Tuvalu), although we can see from the GDP equation in Table 5 that this effect 
is only marginally significant. Thereafter, GDP quickly adjusts to it original level. In the 
unrestricted VAR that we have fitted, the final level of GDP is slightly higher than the 
                                                 
5  Whether aid is in fact strongly exogenous is not relevant to the point of the exercise, which is to 
illustrate the effect of a purely hypothetical innovation in donor policy. Remember that the 
consistency of the regression estimates on which the figures are based depends only on the weak 
exogeneity of aid. 10 
initial level. This is consistent with aid improving productivity in the long run; however, 
this long-run effect is not statistically significant. 
Figure 1 
Unit impulse responses, Cook Islands 




Cook Islands GDP 




Cook Islands real exchange rate 
Source: Author’s  computation. 
 
Figure 2 
Unit impulse responses, Tuvalu 











Tuvalu real exchange rate
Source: Author’s  computation. 11 
Figure 3 
Unit impulse response, Vanuatu 














Source: Author’s  computation. 
 
Figure 4 
Unit impulse response, Tonga 












Tonga real exchange rate
Source: Author’s  computation. 
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The response of GDP in Vanuatu (Figure 3) also looks quite similar, although 
adjustment back to the initial level of income is faster: GDP is very close to its initial 
level by year 3. This is consistent with the conjecture that nominal exchange rate 
adjustment in Vanuatu mitigates the inflationary effects of an increase in aid inflows, 
when otherwise nominal wage inertia may result in falling output. There is a short, 
sharp inflationary period with a 30 per cent drop in GDP, but the economy soon returns 
to its initial state. 
In Tonga (Figure 4), there is a short, sharp depreciation in the real exchange rate by 
about 30 per cent. This is alongside an increase in GDP of a little over 10 per cent. 
While the real exchange quickly returns to its initial level, the increase in GDP is 
persistent. With so little data, this permanent effect is on the edge of statistical 
significance. However, Tonga is the one country where there is at least some evidence 
that aid improves productivity in the long run. 
4 Conclusion 
We have fitted a simple conditional VAR to time-series data for ten Pacific economies 
in order to establish whether there is any evidence for the conjecture that aid inflows 
lead to real exchange rate appreciation and worsening competitiveness. Our results are 
as mixed as those in the existing literature on aid and Dutch disease in other parts of the 
world. We find significant effects only in a minority of our economies, and in one of 
these the effect is in the opposite direction to that normally assumed. However, there is 
clear evidence that the real exchange rate responds to changes in aid inflows in all of the 
smallest economies, suggesting that this is an issue at least partly related to size. 
When aid does have an impact on the real exchange rate, it usually leads to an 
appreciation and loss of competitiveness. It can also lead to a temporary reduction in 
GDP. Possibly, these effects are more persistent in territories with no currency of their 
own, without the facility of nominal exchange rate adjustment. Certainly, the 
macroeconomic management of aid inflows is a serious challenge in very small island 
economies. 
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